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Abstract
Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics was one of the most influential scientific books of the twen-
tieth century. This article looks at the early French reception of cybernetics, using texts
by Pierre de Latil, Georges-The´odule Guilbaud, and Albert Ducrocq to explore how its
themes and ideas were mediated to a French audience. First, it shows how a process of
‘domestication’ took place, in which cybernetics was resituated within a wider French-
European history of science, and in which the translation of some of its key terms
(‘control’, ‘feedback’) resulted in a relatively more disseminated lexical field in the French
language. The article then examines the representation of technology in the three texts,
showing how their extensive work of definition, classification, and explanation of
machine culture could be said to constitute a distinctively ‘French’ mediation of cyber-
netics, in many ways more systematic than that of Wiener’s founding texts. While from
the point of view of the history of ideas the informational–theoretical strand of cyber-
netics can be seen to feed directly into structuralism, it is argued that its operational
strand, involving the mediation of a new technical culture, made an equally important
contribution to subsequent thinking and debate about science and technology in post-
war France.
When the North American mathematician Norbert Wiener met Enrique
Freymann, director of the publishing house Hermann et Cie, in Paris in 1947, he
can hardly have suspected that the result of their lunchtime conversation would be
the publication of a book that can be said to have transformed the landscape of
post-war intellectual history. Responding to Wiener’s expansive descriptions of his
collaborative work on control and feedback mechanisms in machines and biologic-
al systems, Freymann proposed that Wiener should write a book on the subject,
which Hermann would publish. Against all expectations, Wiener delivered a manu-
script to Freymann three months later; even less predictably, the book itself,
Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (1948), went on
to become a scientific bestseller.1
A word makes a world of difference. One of the fascinating details of the early
history of cybernetics is that Wiener and his collaborators had not been able to
find an appropriate term to describe the new interdisciplinary field that they were
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1 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Paris: Hermann;
Cambridge, MA: Technology Press; New York: Wiley, 1948; 2nd edn, 1961). The Freymann episode is related
in Wiener’s autobiography, I Am a Mathematician: The Later Life of a Prodigy (London: Gollancz, 1956),
pp. 314–17, 331.
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beginning to explore.2 What Freymann’s commission forced Wiener to do was
literally to invent the term that would best define the content of his book. In his
autobiography Wiener relates how the importance of the concept of communica-
tion in this new field at first led him to consider the Greek word angelos (‘messen-
ger’), but how he quickly abandoned this term because of the religious
associations of the English word ‘angel’. He finally settled on ‘cybernetics’, a deriv-
ation of the Greek kuberne¯te¯s (‘steersman’), a word whose etymology expressed the
equally important concept of control.3
The history of cybernetics, therefore, rests on two contingencies: the conjunctural
contingency of Wiener’s meeting in Paris with Freymann, and the linguistic contin-
gency of his nomination of the field. The nomination of cybernetics could be said to
have had a powerful performative effect, in that the word functioned as a kind of se-
mantic attractor, metonymically designating a number of convergent trends in
mid-twentieth-century science and technology — information theory, servomechan-
isms, computing machines — and identifying processes of control and regulation
that were common to both machines and living organisms. The intellectual habitus in
which cybernetics was born could in fact be described as a New Scientific
Enlightenment, in which multilingual and internationally mobile scientists such as
Wiener promoted a new kind of universalism where the guiding concept was not
Reason but Information.4 It might seem fitting, therefore, that France played a
pivotal role in the birth of cybernetics, both through Wiener’s close links with
French mathematicians and the intellectual dedication of Hermann et Cie in publish-
ing a book whose commercial prospects neither Wiener nor Freymann rated very
highly. What is perhaps surprising in retrospect, in view of the influence that cyber-
netics was to exercise in France over the following two decades, is the fact that
Wiener’s book was not translated into French.5 In spite of this, the effect of
Cybernetics in France was almost immediate, with a French translation of Wiener’s
second book, The Human Use of Human Beings, appearing in 1952.6 However, in
addition to the direct influence of these founding texts, there was from the start a
wider process of assimilation and mediation of cybernetics in France, resulting in a
specifically ‘French’ version of cybernetics. The intention of this article is to explore
some of the dimensions of this process of cultural translation.
The mediation of cybernetics in France took place on a number of levels. There
were first what may be termed ‘popular’ mediations, such as the article published
2 On the interdisciplinary and collaborative background to cybernetics, notably the celebrated Macy
Conferences, see Steve Joshua Heims, Constructing a Social Science for Postwar America: The Cybernetics Group, 1946–53
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
3 Wiener, I Am a Mathematician, pp. 321–22.
4 On the universalism of cybernetics see Geof Bowker, ‘How to Be Universal: Some Cybernetic Strategies,
1943–70’, Social Studies of Science, 23.1 (1993), 107–27. On the history and influence of the concept of information
see Je´roˆme Segal, Le Ze´ro et le un: histoire de la notion scientifique d’information au 20e sie`cle (Paris: Syllepse, 2003); and
Mathieu Triclot, Le Moment cyberne´tique: la constitution de la notion d’information (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2008).
5 The first French translation of Cybernetics was published in 2014: La Cyberne´tique: information et re´gulation dans le
vivant et la machine, trans. by Ronan Le Roux, Robert Valle´e, and Nicole Valle´e-Le´vi (Paris: Seuil, 2014).
6 Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1950),
published in French as Cyberne´tique et socie´te´, trans. by Pierre-Yves Mistoulon (Paris: Deux-Rives, 1952); Cyberne´tique
et socie´te´: l’usage human des eˆtres humains, rev. trans. by Ronan Le Roux (Paris: Seuil, 2014).
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by Pe`re Dominique Dubarle in Le Monde in December 1948, which focused mainly
on the theme with which cybernetics became most popularly associated: the re-
placement of the human by the machine.7 More detailed and extensive evaluations
were to follow in a range of journals, in established popular-scientific publications
such as Atomes and Sciences et avenir, but also in publications with wider intellectual
agendas such as Esprit, La Pense´e, Critique, Les Temps modernes, and Nouvelle Revue
franc¸aise.8 In the scientific community itself, the early reception of cybernetics was
marked by a series of conferences and the foundation of groups and associations
devoted to its study and dissemination.9 A final category of mediation is repre-
sented in monographs dedicated specifically to explaining the principles of cyber-
netics to a non-scientific public. While each of these categories of mediation is
deserving of attention, the following analysis will be restricted to the monographic
treatments of cybernetics, which provide a particularly structured and informative
picture of the reception of cybernetics in France. Belonging to the relatively
neglected genre of science communication — that is, literature intended to
mediate between the specialized knowledge of science and technology and the
general knowledge of an educated public — collectively these monographs per-
formed an important role in clarifying the basic concepts of cybernetics and
raising awareness of the new technological system it represented. The chronologic-
al range of these texts extends from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, but I will
concentrate here on the earliest examples of reception, which are very close to
Wiener’s original texts and hence important staging posts for subsequent readings
of cybernetics in France. In particular, I will look at three texts published in the
first half of the 1950s: La Pense´e articifielle by Pierre de Latil, La Cyberne´tique by
Georges-The´odule Guilbaud, and De´couverte de la cyberne´tique by Albert Ducrocq.10
I will take these texts as a representative sample of the early assimilation or domes-
tication of cybernetics in France, considering in turn their contextualization of
cybernetics, their definition and translation of some of its key concepts, and their
7 Dominique Dubarle, ‘Une nouvelle science: la cyberne´tique. Vers une machine a` gouverner le monde’,
Le Monde, 28December 1948, pp. 47–49. See Segal, Le Ze´ro et le un, pp. 287–88.
8 See the section of four articles ‘Machines a` penser’, by Albert Be´guin, G.-T. Guilbaud, Dominique Dubarle,
and Paul Chauchard, in Esprit, 18.9 (1950), 273–332; Georges Ambrosino, ‘La Machine savante et la vie’, Critique,
41 (October 1950), 70–82; Raymond Ruyer, ‘La Cyberne´tique: mythes et re´alite´s’, Les Temps modernes, 84 (1952),
577–600; Andre´ Lentin, ‘La Cyberne´tique: proble`mes re´els et mystification’, La Pense´e, 47 (March–April 1953),
47–61; and Louis de Broglie, ‘Sens philosophique et porte´e pratique de la cyberne´tique’, Nouvelle Revue franc¸aise, 7
(July 1953), 60–85.
9 Dedicated conferences on cybernetics were held in Paris in 1950 and 1951. The Cercle d’e´tudes cyberne´tiques,
founded in 1949, organized fourteen sessions between 1951 and 1953. See Segal, Le Ze´ro et le un, pp. 304–306; and
Ronan Le Roux, ‘L’Impossible constitution d’une the´orie ge´ne´rale des machines? La cyberne´tique dans la France
des anne´es 1950’, Revue de synthe`se, 130.1 (2009), 5–36 (pp. 25–26).
10 Pierre de Latil, La Pense´e artificielle: introduction a` la cyberne´tique (Paris: Gallimard, 1953); G.-T. Guilbaud, La
Cyberne´tique (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1954); Albert Ducrocq, De´couverte de la cyberne´tique (Paris: Rene´
Juillard, 1955). (Page references for each of these works will be given in parentheses, preceded, where necessary, by
the author’s name.) Latil (born in 1905) was a science writer who also published science books for children.
Guilbaud (1912–2008) was an applied mathematician who introduced Lacan to cybernetics and worked with
Le´vi-Strauss; see Lydia Liu, The Freudian Robot: Digital Media and the Future of the Unconscious (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2011), pp. 166–85. Ducrocq (1921–2001) was an electronics specialist and prolific science writer
who appeared regularly on French television and radio during the 1960s and 1970s. All three authors were
members of the Cercle d’e´tudes cyberne´tiques. Latil and Guilbaud’s books on cybernetics were subsequently trans-
lated into English, Ducrocq’s into German.
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representation of the technologies that were seen to be characteristic of ‘la re´volu-
tion cyberne´tique’.
This sample of texts is useful for measuring both the speed with which the
ideas of cybernetics became embedded in the French context and the extent of
their influence. All three authors are convergent in their estimation that cybernetics
represents a ‘revolution’ whose effects have been immediate and far-reaching.
Significantly, the first chapter of Latil’s book, entitled ‘Une science explosive’, con-
trasts the influence of cybernetics with that of ‘atomic’ or nuclear science, which
has hitherto cast an ambivalent shadow over the post-war world:
Il y a toute une nouvelle science qui nous apporte la promesse de la plus grande re´volution phi-
losophique autant que scientifique. Oui, la plus grande. Et ne´e, elle aussi, de la guerre. Si l’autre
re´volution a fait exploser la Bombe, la cyberne´tique explose elle-meˆme.
Il ne faut pas voir dans cette phrase un simple effet de style, mais, derrie`re lui, la ve´rite´ pro-
fonde: la re´volution atomique affecte le seul domaine technique, ne nous ayant apporte´ que la
confirmation expe´rimentale de the´ories physiques et chimiques depuis longtemps lentement
e´labore´es. La re´volution cyberne´tique, elle, se de´veloppe avec une e´tonnante, une de´tonnante
rapidite´. (pp. 13–14)
Latil’s association of nuclear science with the Bomb implicitly depicts cybernetics
as its pacific counterpart, whose origins are equally in the war but whose recent ex-
plosion is an epistemological rather than a literal one. To continue the metaphor: it
is not simply the force of the explosion that counts, but the speed and range of its
diffusion. Whereas the atomic revolution is played out between the proximate dis-
ciplines of physics and chemistry over a number of decades, the cybernetic revolu-
tion takes place within the condensed time span of the immediate post-war period,
originating in an unorthodox cross-disciplinary collaboration between mathemat-
ics and physiology and going on to transform a whole range of disciplines. This
interdisciplinary impact is also underlined in Guilbaud’s La Cyberne´tique, which
describes cybernetics as ‘une science-carrefour’, playing an intermediary role by
virtue of its theoretical relevance to entirely different domains of knowledge
(pp. 8–10).
The speed of dissemination of cybernetics, especially in its more popular media-
tions, carried with it the danger of distortion and dilution. Each of the books con-
sidered here is therefore characterized, in different ways, by a strong pedagogic
drive — an attempt to explain and clarify and, if necessary, to correct popular mis-
perceptions of cybernetics. Guilbaud, for example, criticizes the facile assimila-
tions of the science of cybernetics with the technology it is supposed to have
produced: automatic systems, so-called ‘intelligent’ or ‘thinking’ machines, robots,
and anything electronic; he cites the amusing but telling confusion in some
accounts between ‘servo-me´canismes’ and ‘“[c]erveaux” me´caniques’ (p. 8). Latil
insists that cybernetics is not reducible to computers (les machines a` calculer), which,
despite their role in its early history, do not in principle belong to the realm of cy-
bernetics proper (p. 228). These kinds of rectification are part of the educating
mission of the genre to which they belong, that of the expert vulgarisation scientifique,
but accompanying this work of science communication is what might be described
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as a domesticating process, one that tends to make cybernetics more ‘French’ both
in its genealogy and in its lexical field.
I have already indicated what, historically, may be considered to be the ‘French’
origins of cybernetics: Wiener’s meeting with Freymann, which Latil relates in his
introduction (pp. 20–21), and his long-standing collaborations with French math-
ematicians. However, there is a recurrent tendency in early French introductions
to cybernetics to extend this genealogy, first of all with reference to the word itself.
Linguistically speaking, Wiener’s neologism was an inspired choice, a perfect crys-
tallization of the technical and conceptual field he wished to describe. While it is
clear that in this sense Wiener ‘invented’ the word, almost uniformly his French
mediators find it necessary to remind the reader that the term is not new, that
Wiener is unaware of its previous use in French by the great nineteenth-century
physicist Andre´-Marie Ampe`re, who in his Essai sur la philosophie des sciences had
classified la cyberne´tique as part of the science of government (Latil, pp. 23–24;
Guilbaud, p. 6; Ducrocq, p. 11).11 A further qualification traces this linguistic ge-
nealogy back to Plato, notably the Gorgias (511d–12c), where Socrates speaks posi-
tively of the life-saving art of the pilot (kuberne¯tike¯). This attempt to reclaim the
name of cybernetics is accompanied by a reconstruction of its scientific genealogy,
a genealogy in which the importance of French contributions is highlighted. Thus
Pascal is invoked as a precursor in the construction of calculating machines, and
Descartes for his analogies between the machine and the animal (Latil, pp. 25–26;
Ducrocq, p. 106). Closer to the present, the nineteenth-century physiologist
Claude Bernard’s concept of milieu inte´rieur is referenced as an early formulation of
the cybernetic concept of homeostatic regulation (Latil, pp. 107, 270; Ducrocq,
p. 230), while in the twentieth century the French mathematician Louis Couffignal
is cited for his pre- and post-war work on binary computation (Latil, pp. 24, 238–
40; Ducrocq, p. 107). Finally, the French engineer-architect Jacques Lafitte is
credited for his prescient pre-war work on ‘les machines re´flexes’, which is seen to
anticipate some of the major themes of cybernetics (Guilbaud, pp. 12–14). While
none of these references is inaccurate, the cumulative effect of their citation is to
create a recognizably French-European scientific and intellectual history in which
to situate the ‘explosive’ arrival of cybernetics, an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ science originating
in North America.12
11 Andre´-Marie Ampe`re, Essai sur la philosophie des sciences, ou, Exposition analytique d’une classification de toutes les
connaissances humaines (Paris: Bachelier, 1834).
12 Latil most persistently emphasizes the French origins of cybernetics and the importance of its subsequent de-
velopment in Europe (pp. 26, 28). As David Mindell, Je´roˆme Segal, and Slava Gerovitch remark: ‘Crossing inter-
national boundaries placed cybernetics and information theory in completely different cultural contexts, in which
the question of national origins of scientific ideas suddenly acquired great political significance. [. . .] In France,
reactions of many scientists towards cybernetics were, from the beginning, marked by a kind of diffuse national-
ism’; D. Mindell, J. Segal, and S. Gerovitch, ‘From Communications Engineering to Communications Science:
Cybernetics and Information Theory in the United States, France and the Soviet Union’, in Science and Ideology: A
Comparative History, ed. by Mark Walker (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 66–96 (p. 89). Such reactions should be
situated in the wider context of the perceived science and technology gap between France and English-speaking
countries, in part due to the isolation of many French scientists during the Second World War. On the reception of
cybernetics in Britain see Andrew Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain: Sketches of Another Future (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2010).
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Another type of domestication takes place, it could be argued, with respect to
the lexical field of cybernetics. On the one hand, the science and technology
informing cybernetics was international; it would be difficult to argue for any kind
of cultural–scientific relativism in this respect. On the other hand, the manner in
which some of the central concepts of cybernetics were translated into French was
not entirely straightforward. In the sample of texts considered here, it could be
said that in certain cases the translation process creates a different constellation of
terms in relation to the Anglo-American original. If one considers, for example,
the key terms of Wiener’s subtitle, ‘control’ and ‘communication’, it becomes clear
that their translation into French is not equally self-evident. Whereas ‘communica-
tion’, along with related concepts such as ‘signal’ and ‘information’, is able to pass
into French without alteration, the term ‘control’ is not simply and directly trans-
latable as controˆle. The result in the texts considered here is therefore a distribution
or dissemination of the concept of control across a network of associated terms.
The idea of control is central to cybernetics: it describes the coupling of two
systems in which a ‘control’ component directs the actions of an ‘effector’ compo-
nent. In the generation of machines that informed Wiener’s theorization of cyber-
netics, such control is effected by way of an information-bearing signal defining
the actions to be performed. While controˆle is an etymological cousin of the English
word, the limitation of the French term is that in conventional usage it does not
systematically have the English sense of direction or determination, while tempor-
ally it implies an action of checking and verification that takes place after rather
than before an event. In early French mediations of cybernetics it is therefore
interesting to observe a process of linguistic accommodation in which controˆle is
not the predominant term, but is supplemented and relayed by associated terms
such as commande, asservissement, and re´gulation. The first term (commande) clarifies the
semantics of sequence: the order or command is unidirectional and precedes its
execution. The second term (asservissement ) qualifies the hierarchical relationship
between coupled systems: the ‘effector’ component is subordinated to the
‘control’ component. This term is used systematically by all three authors, and is
explicitly related to the ambient technology of servomechanisms, the class of
power mechanisms mediating between the ‘form’ of the command and the ‘force’
of its execution. To quote Guilbaud:
Tous les experts sont d’accord, noˆtre aˆge est celui des servo-me´canismes, comme un aˆge pre´ce´-
dent fut celui de la vapeur. [. . .] A` ce niveau l’ide´e d’asservissement n’est point trop obscure.
Au lieu d’asservissement (d’ou` fut tire´ l’abre´viation: servo) on peut dire aussi: controˆle. C’est
un type de liaison entre deux machines ou e´le´ments de machines: l’un des e´le´ments donne
forme au travail de l’autre; le maıˆtre commande et c’est l’esclave (servus) qui se fatigue. Il y a dis-
sociation de la source d’e´nergie et de l’origine des commandements. (pp. 14–15)
Latil also uses the anthropological metaphor of master and slave to describe the
coupling of control and servomechanisms, referring to ‘me´canismes maıˆtres’ and
‘me´canismes esclaves’ (p. 82). The metaphor is extended and complicated in the
final chapter of Guilbaud’s book, where he elaborates on Wiener’s original image
of the kuberne¯te¯s in order to underline the intermediate nature of the pilot’s role:
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[L]e Kybernetiker, le pilote disons-nous pour traduire, mais pre´cisons selon les paroles d’un
marin d’autrefois: ‘Dans nos vaisseaux,’ dit Bougainville, ‘la fonction du pilote est de veiller a` ce
que les timoniers suivent exactement la route que le capitaine leur ordonne.’ Peu importe que le
pilotage ait pu prendre d’autres formes, ici le pilote est un interme´diaire: il ne tient pas la barre
du gouvernail, ni les autres manœuvres, il ne commande pas non plus, il controˆle, il re`gle les
moyens selon la fin ordonne´e par le capitaine. (p. 120, emphases original)
In De´couverte de la cyberne´tique Ducrocq uses exactly the same image, though without
the reference to Bougainville, to explain the stratified dissociation of command
and execution, which is the basic feature of cybernetic systems (p. 24). As each of
the authors points out, the chain of communication linking initial command to
eventual execution is characterized by a process of amplification. Guilbaud speci-
fies that: ‘la relation d’asservissement se pre´sente souvent comme une amplifi-
cation du signal de commande’ (p. 16). The information characterizing the
‘programme’ to be executed requires only minimal quantities of energy for its
transmission, but its coupling (asservissement ) with servomechanisms powered by
much higher levels of energy means that a quantitatively minimal cause — ‘un
bouton, un levier, un le´ger choc’ (p. 49) — is capable of producing a maximal
effect. In a particularly context-specific example, Ducrocq describes how the
signal from a simple candle flame, coupled with a photoelectric cell and the appro-
priate intermediate amplifiers and relays, might be used to trigger the explosion of
a hydrogen bomb (p. 224).
So far we have only considered cases of linear control, in which there is a unidir-
ectional chain of communication between cause and effect, command and execu-
tion. The other key concept of cybernetics is that of circular causality, or
‘feedback’. Feedback occurs when information on the behaviour or output of a
system is ‘fed back’ to its input in order to compensate for any deviations from the
sequence of action defined in the programme. Once more, it is interesting to
observe how the combined process of translation and explication in the three
French texts leads to the lexical distribution of a term that — like its correlate
‘control’ — tends in its Anglo-American variant to remain singular. Thus, at one
extreme, the most generalized translation of ‘feedback’ is re´tro-action, a term that
captures something of the universality of the concept beyond its original use in
electronics. At another extreme, particularly when dealing with mechanical
systems, ‘feedback’ is treated as a quasi-untranslatable, normally with a preliminary
gloss in French. Guilbaud, for example, refers to ‘re´tro-action ou alimentation en
retour ( feed-back)’ (p. 27); Latil, to ‘feedback ou montage en re´action’ (p. 16), quali-
fying later on that ‘[c]’est un mot du langage radiotechnique. Il signifie “nourrir
a` rebours”’ (p. 52). Somewhere between these two extremes, boucle d’asservissement
translates the concept of circular control expressed in the term ‘feedback loop’. If
we look at the block diagram Ducrocq uses to illustrate the general structure of
the cybernetic system, based on his analogy of the command sequence of the ship,
it can be seen that the terms describing the feedback process are maintained
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entirely within the lexical range of the French asservir–asservissement (see Figure 1).13
The captain communicates information to the pilot on the destination to be
reached (but ). The pilot, who mediates between the captain and the helmsman
(moyens d’action), calculates the sequence of actions necessary to reach the destin-
ation ( programme). However, the ideal or linear sequence of control and
Fig. 1. Block diagram of cybernetic circuit (Albert Ducrocq, De´couverte de la
cyberne´tique, pp. 24–25).# E´ditions Robert Laffont.
13 Guilbaud’s chapter ‘Re´seaux et circuits’ indicates the importance in cybernetics of ‘une symbolisation graphi-
que d’un syste`me de relations’, noting how the use of block diagrams ‘popularise´s par l’e´lectrotechnique et la
radio’ has become generalized beyond the field of electronics (pp. 18–19). He defines the thematic core of cyber-
netics as consisting in the description of spatial relations (networks) and temporal functions (circuits). Within the
‘circle’ or ‘cycle’ of the cybernetic circuit, the dimensions of time and space, ‘structure’ and ‘history’ are inseparable
(pp. 41–42).
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communication between pilot and helmsman (action calcule´e) does not in the real
world of maritime navigation result in a perfect trajectory: inevitably, there is drift
and deviation, or, to use the control engineering term, ‘error’ (e´cart ).14 The pilot is
therefore something more than a simple calculator or programmer: he is also an
information filter (discriminateur) who is able to monitor the result of the original
command, track its degree of deviation from the ideal trajectory ( perception de
l’e´cart ) and correct this deviation through the communication of further com-
mands to the helmsman (signaux d’asservissement–action asservie). This subsidiary
circuit of control, the feedback loop (boucle d’asservissement ) supplementing the
linear control sequence of captain–pilot–helmsman, is indicated by dotted lines in
Ducrocq’s diagram. According to Ducrocq, it is only this second category of
control that can truly be described as cybernetic: ‘asservissement re´el’, ‘asservisse-
ment au sens cyberne´tique du terme’ (p. 209).
To summarize on the question of linguistic difference, it is evident that, whereas
the terminology of Anglo-American cybernetics tends to gravitate towards the
more unitary descriptors of ‘control’ and ‘feedback’, the French mediations of this
terminology are relatively more disseminated.15 Commande provides only a partial
translation of ‘control’, referring to the unilinear transmission of a control signal.
The more general-purpose term asservissement describes the hierarchical control re-
lationship between programme and (servo)mechanism, the second subordinated
to the ends dictated by the first. In the instances where the term controˆle is used by
these authors, it seems to be in a linguistically mixed sense, implying alternately the
unilinear causality of commande and the circular causality of re´tro-action (feedback),
the continuous tracking and correction of action over time and after the event.16
In this latter sense, as suggested above, the word approximates its conventional
meaning of checking and verification, describing a dynamic process of adaptation
to changing external conditions. A final variant of these different translations of
‘control’ can be found in the verb re´gler and its derivatives (re´glage, re´gulation, re´gulari-
sation), which tend to be associated with the idea of equilibrium: the function of
feedback is to eliminate error (l’e´cart ) and maintain the system in a steady state.
This analysis of the lexical field of French cybernetics has concentrated on the
translation of the first term of Wiener’s subtitle, ‘control’, and its correlate ‘feed-
back’. As was noted, the other key term of Wiener’s title, ‘communication’, does
not pose the same problems of translatability; like related terms such as ‘code’,
‘signal’, and ‘message’, it is able to pass into French without alteration. If one is
attempting to track the impact of cybernetics on the subsequent intellectual
history of post-war France, it is interesting to note that it is the information-
theoretical side of cybernetics, as articulated in sequences such as programme–
code–communication–signal–message, that seems to have had the greatest
14 Latil rejects the term erreur in favour of e´cart—machines, he insists, do not make errors (p. 87).
15 This tendency towards lexical dissemination is confirmed if one compares the English translations of Latil
and Guilbaud with the original French texts: Thinking by Machine: A Study of Cybernetics, trans. by Y. M. Golla
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1957); What Is Cybernetics?, trans. by Valerie MacKay (London: Heinemann,
1959).
16 In La Pense´e artificielle Latil explicitly refers to this temporal aspect of retard and de´lai (p. 104).
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impact on the development of structuralism.17 By contrast, the sequence exam-
ined here — commande–controˆle–asservissement–re´troaction–re´gulation — could be
seen as relating more directly to the functional or technical side of cybernetics.
While, as the preceding analysis has shown, these two sides of cybernetics are not
in principle separable, it could be argued that a certain history of ideas has tended
to privilege the information-theoretical side of cybernetics, in particular in its rela-
tion to structuralism, and tended to neglect the equally important question of how
cybernetics might have contributed to French thinking and debate about technol-
ogy in the 1950s and 1960s. In the remainder of this article I will therefore take a
closer look at the representation of technology in early French mediations of
cybernetics.
Latil, Guilbaud, and Ducrocq are categorical in their insistence that cybernetics
is not simply about machines: this has become one of the popular perceptions of
cybernetics that it is the duty of the informed science writer to correct. Like
Wiener, they argue that the cybernetic revolution is as much an epistemological as
it is a technological revolution. The principles it reveals are of the highest order of
generality, applicable to living systems as well as to machines.18 On the other hand,
it is clear that the startling developments in the post-war technological landscape
were eliciting new ways of thinking about machine technology, and a new kind of
reflexivity with respect to its history, filtered through the defining technology of
the period: electronics. Wiener himself had already provided a short history
of technology in The Human Use of Human Beings, presenting the ‘Second Industrial
Revolution’ of cybernetics as the ultimate stage of an accelerating process of
technological development, from the clockwork mechanisms of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries to the steam-powered machines of the nineteenth century
to the electrical and electronic devices of the twentieth.19 While early French med-
iations of cybernetics follow the general contours of Wiener’s history of technol-
ogy, they also tend to provide a much more systematic work of analysis, definition,
and classification of the machine, accompanied by a more long-durational view of
its evolution.20 It is therefore worth undertaking a more detailed reading of these
texts in order to understand more clearly the important shift in the perception of
machine civilization that takes place in the post-war period, in particular through
17 On the influence of cybernetics and information theory on Le´vi-Strauss’s structuralism see Christopher
Johnson, Claude Le´vi-Strauss: The Formative Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 92–102;
Ce´line Lafontaine, L’Empire cyberne´tique: des machines a` penser a` la pense´e machine (Paris: Seuil, 2004), pp. 85–102;
Ronan Le Roux, ‘Le´vi-Strauss, une re´ception paradoxale de la cyberne´tique’, L’Homme: revue franc¸aise d’anthropologie,
189 (2009), 165–90 (pp. 169–70, 177–78); and Bernard Dionysius Geoghegan, ‘From Information Theory to
French Theory: Jakobson, Le´vi-Strauss, and the Cybernetic Apparatus’, Critical Inquiry, 38 (2011), 96–126
(pp. 102–21).
18 Following Wiener, Ducrocq defines life as organization against entropy, ‘la re´alisation naturelle de la cyberne´-
tique’ (p. 227). Latil extends the scope of cybernetics into the realm of nature itself, describing the natural world
as the ultimate self-regulating system, based on the Democritean-Epicurean principle of the clinamen (pp. 165,
323–25).
19 Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings, pp. 164–89.
20 Le Roux notes that Wiener’s Cybernetics ‘ne se pre´sente absolument pas comme un essai de the´orie ge´ne´rale
des machines, et que ce sont les Franc¸ais, en un certain sens, qui le tirent dans cette aire de discussion explicite’
(‘L’Impossible constitution’, p. 25).
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cybernetics. The following analysis will look at the different definitions of the
machine provided by the three authors, as well as specific examples of key areas of
post-war technological development: industrial production, aviation, and comput-
ing.
Guilbaud’s La Cyberne´tique defines the machine as being constructed for a deter-
mined end (but de´termine´ ), with certain classes of machine incorporating a ‘pro-
gramme’ into their mechanism for the automatic realization of this end. The
operation of this category of programmed machines is, however, rigid, its prede-
termined sequences of actions functioning at fixed intervals, as in clockwork
mechanisms or punch-card-operated weaving machines or pianolas. Another class
of machines, ‘plus e´volue´es’, are more flexible — ‘ces machines que J. Lafitte pro-
posait de nommer re´flexes ’ (p. 30) — and are capable of reacting and adjusting to
external conditions through the mechanism of feedback. Guilbaud qualifies that
this distinction between different types of machine is more apparent than real, and
has more to do with a process of evolution in time than with simple classification:
il s’agit moins de deux classes de machine que d’une opposition, ou si l’on pre´fe`re, d’un
progre`s d’une machine a` l’autre. [. . .] On peut ainsi observer, dans l’e´volution de nombreux
dispositifs, une hie´rarchie de re´glages subordonne´s les uns aux autres. (pp. 30–32)
Latil’s more extensive analysis of the machine in his chapter ‘Le Re`gne artifi-
ciel’ is based on the concept of degrees of ‘automatisme’, moving from the
degree zero of the simple hand-held tool to the progressively higher degrees of
autonomy achieved in different classes of complex machine (see Figure 2). He
describes this evolution as consisting in the progressive delegation of human
thought to the artefact — hence the title of his book, La Pense´e artificielle. The
machine is therefore defined as being essentially an ‘enregistreur de pense´e’: ‘A`
tout degre´ d’automatisme, la machine prend donc charge d’un certain raisonne-
ment qu’elle aura enregistre´’ (p. 47). Like Guilbaud, Latil sees the first half of the
twentieth century as marking a qualitative shift in the evolution of the machine,
one in which the rigid programme characteristic of classical mechanics (second
degree of automatism) is superseded by more flexible, ‘sensitive’ programmes
reacting to variations in their environment (third degree of automatism), fol-
lowed by the reactive and adaptive systems representative of the cybernetic era
(fourth degree of automatism). The defining technology underlying and enabling
these shifts is electronics.
Ducrocq takes a relatively longer view on the evolution of the machine in his
chapter ‘Destine´e des machines’, beginning with its prehistory in the human body
itself and reconstructing the successive stages of development from the human to
the tool to the self-regulating machine. Continuing the analogy, cited above, of the
command sequence of a ship, he writes that:
Sur son simple de´sir, l’homme reveˆt tour a` tour le costume du capitaine, du pilote et du timo-
nier a` moins qu’il ne pre´fe`re porter tous les costumes a` la fois, selon une confusion — courante
dans notre vie personnelle — qui vaut une e´tonnante souplesse d’exe´cution a` nos actions.
(p. 26)
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Fig. 2. Table of classification of degrees of automatism (Pierre de Latil, La Pense´e artificielle,
back flap illustration).# E´ditions Gallimard.
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The human body is the epitome of the stratified cybernetic system, its reticulated
circuits of communication and control facilitating the multiple movements of the
hand or the deceptively simple act of walking upright on two legs (p. 27).
However, the human body alone has a limited capacity for action in the material
world, and it is only through the ‘tactic’ of the tool that it is able to transcend this
limitation. Beginning with the sharp flint that early humans would have randomly
selected from the natural environment, the intentional imitation and perfection of
these cutting instruments led to the production of tools, followed by an increas-
ing diversification of tool types as a means of manipulating the material world.
Ducrocq defines the tool in cybernetic terms, as ‘l’agent permettant l’application
se´lective d’une certaine e´nergie au syste`me que l’on gouverne’ (p. 28). The energy
that actions the tool is provided directly by the human body, whereas the ‘imper-
ceptible’ transition from tool to machine is accompanied by a conversion of the
energy source, the machine being defined as ‘le dispositif ou` une e´nergie est trans-
forme´e de manie`re a` eˆtre ensuite utilisable pour une action de´termine´e’ (p. 30).
Until the end of the eighteenth century the motive force for the machine was
either human or natural, whereas in the nineteenth century the creation of artificial
(steam and, later, electric) motors meant that the machine was ‘liberated’ from its
energy source: ‘ces e´nergies articifielles eurent pour conse´quence de libe´rer com-
ple`tement les circuits d’action’ (p. 33). The Industrial Revolution, therefore, saw an
exponential increase in the machine’s potential for the manipulation of matter, and
a proliferation of the category of the machine tool (p. 34). This was combined
with the perfection of automatic transmission systems permitting ‘une re´duction
syste´matique des actions commande´es en liant celles-ci les unes aux autres dans le
cadre de programmes de´termine´s’ (p. 37, emphasis original). Despite the sophisti-
cation of these automatic systems, inherited from the mechanics of the eighteenth
century, their limitation lay in the rigidity of the control process: any extension or
complication of the chain of transmission would inevitably result in a ‘play’ ( jeu)
which would very quickly compromise the machine’s precision (pp. 38–39). In
cases where a greater operating precision was required, it was therefore necessary
to break up the chain of transmission and reintroduce the human agent, who
would check and regulate the machine’s output. Again, Ducrocq describes the
‘circuit’ of production in cybernetic terms:
Cela permet de revenir a` des commandes individuelles, susceptibles d’eˆtre controˆle´es, e´tant entendu
que l’asservissement e´tait hier essentiellement assure´ par l’interme´diaire du maillon humain: c’est
l’œil de l’ouvrier qui surveillait le travail, commandant a` la machine les mouvements voulus pour
corriger les e´carts e´ventuels par rapport au programme. (p. 40, my emphasis)
In the advanced industrial factory, the human being is no longer exploited for his
or her muscular energy, but is still employed as an observer and regulator in the
chain, or, rather, circuit of production. Ducrocq describes this precybernetic stage
of automation as representing one of the final instances of alienation in the history
of human–machine systems:
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Or c’est bien brimer l’homme [. . .] que de l’employer comme simple maillon dans une boucle
d’asservissement. Hier, cet emploi, bien que de´plorable, pouvait paraıˆtre ne´cessaire car on
n’entrevoyait pas d’autre manie`re d’exe´cuter un travail. Mais justement, cette seconde moitie´
du XXe sie`cle doit bien en ce sens annoncer la vraie libe´ration: ayant cesse´ d’eˆtre employe´
comme moteur, l’homme cessera de l’eˆtre comme timonier. (p. 77)
The decisive threshold of ‘la re´volution cyberne´tique’ is crossed when human reg-
ulators (timoniers) are replaced by truly automatic (feedback) systems in which all
aspects of the control process delineated in Ducrocq’s block diagram (see
Figure 1) are integrated into the machine. This is made possible because of con-
temporary advances in electronics, which allow not only for the electrical rather
than mechanical transmission of the control signal, but also for the electrical signal
to be deployed in the processing of information at higher levels in the chain of
command: ‘non contente d’avoir pe´ne´tre´ dans le circuit de l’information au stade
de l’asservissement, la machine entend remonter ce circuit pour prendre posses-
sion de tous les postes du sche´ma cyberne´tique’ (p. 41). Thus, according to
Ducrocq, the new age of cybernetics will be the age of the ‘usine asservie’ (p. 76).
A similar configuration is described in Latil’s fourth chapter, ‘Vers les usines sans
hommes: le controˆle automatique’.21
It is not only the factory system — the paradigmatic case of human alienation
— that is subject to the effects of the cybernetic revolution. The post-war techno-
logical landscape is in fact marked by a range of higher-level substitutions of the
human agent by the machine. In the field of aviation, for example, Ducrocq notes
that the function of the pilot has been transformed over a period of less than
twenty-five years. Whereas in 1930 flying was still an art, the pilot handling his or
her machine in much the same manner as one would handle a horse, in the
present day the pilot’s perception, judgement, and actions are mediated by radar
and a host of electronic equipment located both in the plane and on the ground
(pp. 12–13). The control of powered flight requires the regulation of continuously
changing variables in three dimensions, a deviation (e´cart ) in one axis creating a
corresponding deviation in another. The so-called automatic pilot is an example of
a ‘ve´ritable asservissement couple´’ in which the human agent is relieved by the
servomechanism, which senses, compares, and corrects any deviation from the
programmed course of the aircraft (pp. 72–73).
The other key domain of machine substitution referred to by the authors is that
of the human mind itself. The ‘machines’ in question are, of course, computers,
which in early 1950s France were still being described as calculatrices or machines a`
calculer.22 Guilbaud and Latil are particularly sceptical about popular fixations on
the idea of the computer as a machine a` penser. Guilbaud, it will be remembered,
cites the erroneous assimilation of ‘servo-me´canismes’ and ‘“[c]erveaux” me´cani-
ques’ as a symptom of popular misunderstandings of cybernetics (p. 8). The title
21 In line with the initial Soviet response, French Marxist-Communist reactions to cybernetics were at first ex-
tremely negative, an attitude that persisted until the revision of Soviet policy in the mid-1950s. See Mindell, Segal,
and Gerovitch, ‘From Communications Engineering’, pp. 78–79, 81–88; and Segal, Le Ze´ro et le un, pp. 320–29.
22 The now-standard term ordinateur was introduced by IBM France in 1955.
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of Latil’s book, La Pense´e artificielle, is itself something of a rhetorical trap, referring,
as we saw above, to the human delegation of programmed action to machines
rather than the mechanical reproduction of human thought. As the author
remarks: ‘Comme les machines a` calculer ne sont que les dernie`res ne´es des
machines e´lectroniques, comme elles assument des fonctions qui, chez l’homme,
ressortissent du cerveau, elles nous semblent, pour quelques anne´es encore, parti-
culie`rement e´tonnantes’ (p. 246). In fact, the computer or calculating machine
represents a relatively low degree of automatism in Latil’s classification of
machines (see Figure 2). It is certainly automatic, but its programme is rigid and
thoroughly determined. It will perform, with spectacular speed, precision, and reli-
ability, calculations that are beyond the capacity of the human computer, but it is
not, properly speaking, cybernetic (pp. 228, 247; see also Ducrocq, pp. 110–11).
Despite these attempts to demystify popular mythologies surrounding the
computer, there is a clear recognition by the three authors of its scientific and tech-
nical importance vis-a`-vis the cybernetic revolution. Thus Guilbaud’s chapter
‘Signaux et messages’ deals at length with the mathematical work on coding and
communication — information theory, binary arithmetic, and combinatorial ana-
lysis — that was central to the development of the digital computer.23 Latil’s more
technical exposition devotes a chapter to ‘Les Machines a` calculer’, in which he
explains the basic principles of mechanical calculation, along with some of the
recent history of the development of electronic computation in Europe and the
United States. Ducrocq’s chapter, ‘La Calculatrice instruit l’homme’, covers much
the same ground, though with more historical detail and statistical information.
Probably the most technically erudite of the three authors, he also provides a
twenty-page ‘Lexique des calculatrices dans le monde’ in the appendix to his book.
Ducrocq notes a geometrical progression in the production of computers in
Western-bloc countries, with a numerical preponderance of these machines in the
United States and England. Based on current trends, he predicts a doubling every
two years in the number of computers in global use (p. 133).24
The computer is therefore paradigmatic of the acceleration in technological de-
velopment experienced in the second half of the twentieth century, a development
that is inseparable from the revolution in electronics. While, as Ducrocq reminds
us, the basic principles of mechanical calculation remain unchanged since Pascal’s
invention of 1642, the transition in the first part of the twentieth century to electro-
mechanical operation (gears activated by electric motors) and more recently to
23 As a mathematician Guilbaud tends to devote more attention — more than half of the 128 pages of the stand-
ard Que sais-je? format — to the information-theoretical side of cybernetics. This results in a rather unbalanced
exposition, which probably explains the book’s replacement in the early 1960s by Louis Couffignal’s more work-
manlike introduction, La Cyberne´tique (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1963).
24 Ducrocq points to a significant gap between France and ‘le bloc anglo-saxon’ in the development of comput-
ing technology (pp. 133, 135). Equally aware of this deficit, Latil criticizes the ‘gigantisme’ of American technology,
contrasting its ‘esprit de ge´ome´trie’ with the ‘esprit de finesse’ of European science, as represented in Louis
Couffignal’s research programme at the Institut Blaise Pascal (pp. 233, 238–41). Couffignal’s influence, and his pri-
oritization of more powerful calculating units rather than memory-based programme storage, was to compromise
France’s progress in computing technology significantly during the 1950s. See Girolamo Ramunni, ‘Louis
Couffignal, 1902–1966: Informatics Pioneer in France?’, Annals of the History of Computing, 11.4 (1989), 247–56;
and Segal, Le Ze´ro et le un, pp. 310–11.
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properly electronic operation (electrical pulses moving through circuits) has led to
exponential increases in calculating speeds. The use of electrical signals as
triggers and switches in these more recent machines has resulted in the definitive
liberation of information processing from the inertia of mechanical parts
(Ducrocq, pp. 106–107). This, according to Latil, is ‘le progre`s de´cisif de notre
e´poque: se libe´rer de l’inertie des pie`ces me´talliques mobiles en utilisant l’e´lectron dont l’inertie
est, a` notre e´chelle, pratiquement nulle ’ (p. 246, emphasis original).
In one sense, the automation in the computer of the ‘higher’ functions of the
human mind (calculation, decision, simulation) might be seen to achieve the ultim-
ate stage of machine substitution, as represented in Ducrocq’s and Guilbaud’s
analogy of cybernetic control: within the stratified system of the ship not only the
stations of the timonier and pilote, but also that of the capitaine, can be mechanically
(or electronically) reproduced. However, Latil is dismissive of popular fears of
human subjection to ‘thinking machines’, insisting that at each stage of automation
it is humans who delegate the programme to the machine and define its para-
meters of operation (p. 314). Far from resulting in subjection, he sees the cybernet-
ic revolution as enabling the enhancement of the human species through its
artificially augmented organs of perception and action:
Par ses progre`s scientifiques, l’espe`ce humaine est actuellement en pleine ‘evolution’ [. . .]
l’homme, sous nos yeux, modifie son ‘qui’ par ses actuelles inventions: plus je de´tecte les attri-
buts du monde et peux agir sur le monde, plus je participe au monde. Chaque fois que je me
donne des organes artificiels nouveaux qui me valent des contacts passifs (de´tecteurs sensitifs)
ou des contacts actifs (machines agissantes), chaque fois j’inte`gre dans mon syste`me e´quilibre´
une plus grande part du monde. Je recule mes limites. Je de´veloppe mon ‘qui’. (pp. 316, 320)25
For Latil, the consequences of this coevolution of human and machine systems
are not simply material and pragmatic but also epistemological. Extrapolating to
the future development of cybernetic technology, he claims that it would be a
mistake to attribute human faculties such as attention, memory, judgement, or im-
agination to such machines; the problem of la pense´e artificielle is a false problem, an
anthropomorphism. Instead, the continuing development of autonomous systems
has a revealing function, encouraging us to rethink the nature of human thinking
and to question the traditional philosophical partitions of the human psyche
(pp. 212–13). Thus the cybernetic revolution opens the way to a new kind of
human science: ‘Ainsi l’e´tude de la machine sera, par un extraordinaire mais fatal
retournement, la base de l’e´tude de l’homme. Cette science de l’homme n’en
restera pas moins proprement humaine’ (p. 213).26
To summarize on the representation of technology: the taxonomy of machines
and history of technology found in Latil, Guilbaud, and Ducrocq can be seen to
constitute a convergent narrative that takes the reader from the simplest manifes-
tations of human technical activity to the most advanced delegations of technical
25 In Latil’s table (see Figure 2) the higher (cybernetic) levels of automatism are classified according to the relative
degrees of freedom of the qui, the quoi, and the comment.
26 The largely forgotten history of the role of cybernetics in the development of the cognitive sciences is
explored in Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Aux origines des sciences cognitives, 2nd edn (Paris: La De´couverte, 1999).
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function in self-correcting machines. This quasi-teleological narrative allows the
reader to understand the past and the present of technological development and
also to extrapolate to its near future. In this respect, and in line with our initial de-
scription of cybernetics as a New Scientific Enlightenment, the representation of
technology in these early texts is almost without exception a positive and optimis-
tic one. It describes a universal history of technical perfectibility in which humanity
achieves an ever more precise and effective control over the material world
through the delegation of an ever-increasing proportion of human function to the
machine. Like all universal histories, it designates significant turning points, in this
case, pre- and post-war, the first half of the twentieth century and the second, in
which advances in the rapidly moving field of electronics are integrated into a
growing range of technical applications. Like all enlightenment narratives, it antici-
pates the liberation of the individual from servitude — in the second half of the
twentieth century, servitude to mental as well as manual forms of labour. At the
same time, through the universalization of the concept of information, this narra-
tive proposes new ways of understanding the nature of life, mind, and society.
The systematic optimism of these accounts of cybernetics — their confidence
in humanity’s capacity to understand, master, and adapt to its inventions —
cannot be seen as entirely typical of post-war attitudes towards technology. The
kind of scientific humanism they propose is indeed quite different from that of
the founding father of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, whose attitude towards the
Second Industrial Revolution was somewhat more ambivalent. On the one hand,
Wiener was deeply concerned about the unchecked effects of industrial automa-
tion in the United States. Part of the popular appeal of Cybernetics and The Human
Use of Human Beings lay in their author’s ability as a scientist to crystallize this
ambient concern about technology and explain to an educated public what was
different about the machines emerging in the wake of the Second World War. On
the other hand, there was the continuing question, during what was now officially
the Cold War, of the military applications of cybernetics. Wiener himself had
worked on the automation of anti-aircraft weapons systems during the war, re-
search that subsequently formed the basis of his first theoretical publications on
cybernetics.27 However, like a number of American scientists, after the deploy-
ment of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 he withdrew
his collaboration from any research projects with potential for military develop-
ment.28 If one looks at the generically optimistic representation of technology in
early French mediations of cybernetics, there is little trace of the moral ambiva-
lence expressed in Wiener’s writings. Descriptions of automatic pilots and worker-
less factories alternate with references to guided missiles and pilotless rockets,
supported by analogue computers designed to simulate their flight and digital
27 On the relationship between Wiener’s wartime research and the post-war development of cybernetics see
Peter Galison, ‘The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision’, Critical Inquiry, 21 (1994),
228–66.
28 See Wiener’s comments on automation and the dilemmas facing the post-war scientist in I Am a
Mathematician, pp. 293–313.
CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON76
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/fs/article/69/1/60/2962635 by U
niversity of N
ottingham
 user on 15 Septem
ber 2020
computers to calculate their trajectories. These military developments of cybernet-
ics are presented as facts rather than questions, part of the cutting edge of the au-
tonomous technologies of the period. However, a cloud passes momentarily over
Latil’s account of the cybernetic revolution when he writes: ‘On en revient donc
toujours a` ceci: les miraculeuses machines ou` la cyberne´tique pourrait e´panouir
toutes ses ressources paraissent n’eˆtre utilisables que pour des œuvres de mort’
(p. 261).
This article has examined two dimensions of the early reception of cybernetics
in France. First, we have seen that this reception involves a process of domestica-
tion, both with respect to the prehistory of cybernetics and the patterning of its
lexical field. In the sample of texts considered, a genealogy of cybernetics is estab-
lished that allows the reader to situate this ‘Anglo-Saxon’ science within a wider
French-European history of science. If cybernetics as a named and designated
field begins with the individual inspiration of a North American mathematician in
1947, it must also be reclaimed and recontextualized as a properly international
phenomenon. On the linguistic level, the ‘translation’ of cybernetics into French
can be seen to generate a lexical field that is relatively more disseminated than its
Anglo-American counterpart. While the scientific and technical referents remain
the same, the constellation of terms that describe and define them does not. As I
have suggested, the reconstruction of elements of this lexical field may be particu-
larly useful in tracking the incidence of cybernetics in the subsequent intellectual
history of France, across a wide range of thinkers and texts.29
The second part of this analysis of French cybernetics focused on the represen-
tation of technology. The texts considered above replicate Wiener’s original evalu-
ation that there is something qualitatively different about the technological
revolution of the post-war period, and each of them attempts to provide the
reader with an informed understanding of the science behind this revolution as
well as its wider implications for society. What is interesting is the extent to which
this work of science communication, in particular when expressed in the medium
of another language and another culture, acquires its own exegetical momentum
and interpretative (relative) autonomy in relation to the ‘source’ text. As the
sample of texts has demonstrated, early French mediators of cybernetics can be
seen to create an independent corpus of reflection on technology that is in many
ways more systematic in its work of definition, classification, and clarification —
in short, more ‘French’ — than what one finds in Wiener’s founding texts. It has
been impossible to convey, within the space of this article, the sheer range of tech-
nical description and diagrammatic exposition presented to the reader in these
accounts: it is necessary physically to open the books in order to get the proper
measure of this technical culture. In this respect, cybernetics can indeed be
29 Apart from the assimilation of cybernetics by first-generation post-war thinkers such as Lacan and
Le´vi-Strauss (see nn. 10 and 17 above), it is also important to recognize its significance for a later generation of
thinkers, including Gilbert Simondon, Michel Serres, Edgar Morin, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, and Lyotard.
See Ce´line Lafontaine, L’Empire cyberne´tique, pp. 143–70; and C. Lafontaine, ‘The Cybernetic Matrix of “French
Theory”’, Theory Culture Society, 24.5 (2007), 27–46 (pp. 37–41).
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described as a New Scientific Enlightenment and its French mediators as new
encyclope´distes, dedicated to the demystification of technology and the formalization
of its structure and function. For this reason, the early French reception of cyber-
netics should be viewed as an important incubation period for subsequent debates
about science and technology in post-war France, a field that is certainly in need of
further exploration.
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